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Abstract
Based on the fact that the entanglement can not be created locally, we pro-
posed a quantum bit commitment protocol, in which entangled states and
quantum algorithms is used. The bit is not encoded with the form of the
quantum states, and delaying the measurement is required. Therefore the
protocol will not be denied by the Mayers-Lo-Chau no-go theorem, and un-
conditional security is achieved.
Typeset using REVTEX
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Started from the original idea of Wiesner [1], quantum cryptography is playing an essen-
tial role in nowadays research on quantum information. Besides the well-known quantum
key distribution protocol [2–4], another crucial primitive in quantum cryptography is quan-
tum bit commitment (QBC). As shown by Yao [5], a secure QBC scheme can be used to
implement a secure quantum oblivious transfer scheme [6,7]. And Kilian [8] has shown
that, in classical cryptography, oblivious transfer can be used to implement two-party se-
cure computations [9]. Many other cryptographies, such as quantum coin tossing [2,10–12]
and quantum oblivious mutual identification [13], can also be constructed over QBC. All
these cryptographies are very useful in the so-called “post-cold-war era”, with a wide range
of economic, financial and even military applications. In classical cryptography, these tasks
can only be done through trusted intermediaries. Otherwise some unproven computational
assumptions must be invoked, such as the hardness of factoring, which can easily be bro-
ken when quantum computer becomes practical [14]. Therefore people hope that quantum
cryptography can get rid of those requirements, and the same goals can be achieved using
the laws of physics alone. However, Mayers, Lo and Chau have claimed that unconditionally
secure QBC scheme can never be achieved in principle [15,16], and all the protocols formerly
purposed [5,17] are insecure. By delaying the measurement on quantum states, the partici-
pants can always succeed in cheating with Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen(EPR)-type of attacks,
or the so-called Mayers attacks. This discovery is called the Mayers-Lo-Chau no-go theorem
or MLC theorem. During the past half decade, attempts on fixing the problem with classi-
cal BC protocols (such as the classical computational BC scheme [18,19] or the two-prover
BC scheme [20]) are also proven to be failed later [21,22]. Some protocols have to rely on
relativity assumptions [23] or reduce to conditionally secure [24]. The failure of QBC seems
to bring a fatal limitation to the power of quantum cryptography.
But in this paper, we will propose a new QBC protocol which can not be denied by
the MLC theorem. EPR attacks will no longer succeed and unconditional security can be
achieved.
A bit commitment scheme between two parties (Alice and Bob) generally includes two
phases. In the commit phase, Alice has in mind a bit (b = 0 or 1) which she wants to commit
to Bob. So she sends him a piece of evidence. Later, in the unveil phase, Alice announces
the value of b, and Bob checks it with the evidence. A protocol is said to be binding if Alice
cannot change the value of b after the commit phase, and is said to be concealing if Bob
cannot tell what b is before the unveil phase. A secure protocol needs to be both binding
and concealing.
The argument of the MLC theorem is based on the Yao’s general model of QBC [5].
According to this model, previously proposed protocols that proven to be insecure are all
starting with the following steps: Alice prepares a state |0〉 = ∑
j
√
λj |αj〉 ⊗ |βj〉 if b = 0
or |1〉 = ∑
j
√
λj
∣∣α′j
〉 ⊗ |βj〉 if b = 1, and sends the second register to Bob. Then Alice
is supposed to carry out measurement on the first register to make it collapse to |αk〉 or
|α′k〉 according to the value of b. And Bob measures the second register to verify Alice’s
commitment. But in these protocols, the entanglement inside the quantum states is not
fully utilized. Any classical information that the participants need to announce during
the commit phase required by the protocol can all be calculated without the help of the
entanglement. That is, the calculation involved is not thoroughly a quantum algorithm.
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The value of b in fact depends only on the form of the first register, and not the form of
the entire entangled state. As we know, entangled quantum states have the power to carry
out parallel computations, which is much more powerful than classical algorithm. Therefore
it is not surprise to see that by making full use of the entangled states, Alice can execute
the protocol successfully even she delays her measurement, just as if she is executing the
commitment with b = 0 and b = 1 simultaneously. Then in the unveil phase, she can apply
local transformation on the first register to map the state between |0〉 and |1〉. This is the
reason why Alice can cheat in these protocols [15,16,25].
So we can see that, to propose a secure QBC protocol that can stand this so-called Mayers
attack, we must make full use of the computation power of the entangled states. The effect
of the entanglement must be taken into consideration throughout the commitment, thus
quantum algorithms must be involved. So the outline of our new protocol goes as: In the
commit phase, Alice and Bob first share some certain entangled states which can solve a
certain problem with quantum algorithm; Then Alice shows Bob that she has indeed solved
the problem. Solving the problem should be able to force Alice to measure a minimum
set of states even with the most efficient quantum algorithm, while the other states can be
left unmeasured. Then we correlate the commit bit b with the states according to whether
the states is measured or not. In the unveil phase, Alice should show Bob that there is a
certain number of states which are indeed unmeasured. A state which is already measured
and collapsed can not be used to fake a state which is still entangled with another state.
Therefore the security of the commitment can be guaranteed.
For concreteness, in the following we shall use four quantum states of photon with differ-
ent polarizations in the description. But in fact the protocol can be constructed on any other
type of nonorthogonal states as well. Here we denote the four states of light polarization
of angles 0◦, 45◦, 90◦ and 135◦ as |0, 0〉, |1, 0〉, |0, 1〉 and |1, 1〉 respectively. We will also
consider the ideal setting only, where the quantum communication channel is supposed to
be error-free. Before we get to the protocol, let us first consider the following problem:
Problem P:
Alice and Bob execute the following procedure:
(1) Alice sends Bob a series of photons {βi|i ∈ S} where S ≡ {1, ..., s} is a set of natural
numbers;
(2)
s
DO
i=1
Bob randomly picks a bit p′i and measures βi in the rectilinear basis (0
◦ and 90◦
polarized) if p′i = 0, or the diagonal basis (45
◦ and 135◦ polarized) if p′i = 1. The outcome
is denoted as |p′i, q′i〉β;
(3) Bob announces to Alice a series of “fake” results {|p′′i , q′′i 〉β |i ∈ S}, which needs not
to be agreed with {|p′i, q′i〉β |i ∈ S}. He can choose to apply three types of lies:
lie a : p′′i = p
′
i ∧ q′′i =qq′i;
lie b : p′′i =qp
′
i ∧ q′′i = q′i;
lie c : p′′i =qp
′
i ∧ q′′i =qq′i.
Let La = {i ∈ S| |p′′i , q′′i 〉β = |p′i, qq′i〉β}, Lb = {i ∈ S| |p′′i , q′′i 〉β = |qp′i, q′i〉β}, and Lc =
{i ∈ S| |p′′i , q′′i 〉β = |qp′i, qq′i〉β}, with fa = |La| /s, fb = |Lb| /s and fc = |Lc| /s denoting the
frequencies of Bob applying each type of lies. Suppose that 0 < fa, fb, fc < 1/4 and fb > fc.
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Now the question is: how can Alice detects a set of lies D such that D ⊂ La ∪ Lb ∪ Lc
and |D| ∼ (fa/2 + fb/4 + fc/4)s?
This problem can easily be solved by the following “semi-classical” method. Alice can
determine the states of all the s photons beforehand, i.e. in step (1) she prepares every
photon βi in a pure state |pi, qi〉β non-entangled with any other systems. Then she sets
D = {i ∈ S| |p′′i , q′′i 〉β = |pi, qqi〉β} after Bob announces {|p′′i , q′′i 〉β |i ∈ S} in step (3). Now let
us evaluate the size of this set D. Since p′i is randomly chosen by Bob, for half of the states
Bob will by chance choose the correct basis p′i = pi. Among this half, whenever Bob applies
a lie a, it will be detected by Alice since she knows that Bob can never find qi as qqi in his
measurement once he uses the correct basis. But no lie b and lie c will be detected, since
when Bob announces p′′i =qp
′
i =qpi, Alice does not know what the result should be when
|pi, qi〉β is measured in the wrong basis p′′i . Meanwhile for the other half of states that Bob
has measured with the wrong basis p′i =qpi, the probabilities of finding q
′
i = qi and q
′
i =qqi
are both 1/2. Therefore when Bob applies lie b or lie c, p′′i =qp
′
i becomes the correct basis.
The probability for such a state to satisfy |p′′i , q′′i 〉β = |pi, qqi〉β is then 1/2. But no lie a
will be detected in this case since p′′i = p
′
i is the wrong basis now. So we can see that, the
number of lies that Alice totally detects is |D| ∼ (fa/2 + fb/4 + fc/4)s. That is, such a set
D is just what is required by the problem.
But with full quantum algorithms we can solve the problem more efficiently. Alice can
prepare every photon βi as a mixture entangled with another system αi. For example, in
step (1) she can prepare the state of the whole incremental system as |ψi〉 = |αi ⊗ βi〉 =
cos θi |x〉α ⊗ |0, qi〉β + sin θi |y〉α ⊗ |1, qi〉β, where |x〉α and |y〉α are orthogonal to each other,
qi ∈ {0, 1} and θi ∈ (0, pi/2). She sends βi to Bob, and after step (3) she divides S into two
subsets: M = {i ∈ S|q′′i =qqi} and U = {i ∈ S|q′′i = qi}. Due to the specific form of |ψi〉,
Bob is more likely to find βi as qi than qqi no matter which basis he uses. Therefore when
Alice finds Bob announcing q′′i =qqi, she knows that he is more likely to be lying. So for
the states whose indices are included in U , she can just leave them unmeasured. And for
∀i ∈M , She measures αi in the basis (|x〉α , |y〉α). She sets pi = 0 if she finds |x〉α or pi = 1
if she finds |y〉α. Then she sets D = {i ∈M |pi = p′′i }. Detailed analyses can prove that both
D ⊂ La ∪ Lb ∪ Lc and |D| ∼ (fa/2 + fb/4 + fc/4)s are automatically satisfied. Calculations
also show that |M | ∼ [1/4+ (fa + fc)/2]s when Bob chooses p′i randomly. Thus we see that
Alice can detect D by measuring only [1/4 + (fa + fc)/2]s states. In the “semi-classical”
method described above, Alice’s action in step (1) is equivalent to preparing the states in an
entangled form as well at first , but then measures all the s entangled states |ψi〉 to make βi
collapse into non-entangled pure states before Bob measure them. So we can see now with
the full use of the computational power of the entangled states, Alice manages to measure
less states than the “semi-classical” method while the same goal is achieved.
This quantum algorithm is already the most efficient one. One can verify that preparing
|ψi〉 in other forms will have to measure more states when detecting D. For example, if Alice
prepares |ψi〉 = |αi ⊗ βi〉 = cos θi |x〉α ⊗ |0, 0〉β + sin θi |y〉α ⊗ |0, 1〉β and always measures
αi in the basis which can force βi to collapse to p
′′
i , she will need to measure s/2 states to
detect D. Or if she prepares |ψi〉 = |αi ⊗ βi〉 = cos θi |x〉α ⊗ |0, 0〉β + sin θi |y〉α ⊗ |1, 1〉β and
always measures those that satisfy |p′′i , q′′i 〉β = |0, 1〉β ∨ |p′′i , q′′i 〉β = |1, 0〉β, she will need to
measure [1/4 + (fa + fb)/2]s states. All these numbers are larger than [1/4 + (fa + fc)/2]s
given fa, fb, fc < 1/4 and fb > fc.
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So if we build a protocol in which Alice is required to solve Problem P while only
[1/4+ (fa + fc)/2]s states are allowed to be measured, she has to follow the above quantum
algorithm honestly. Now let us give a parameter c0i to each state |ψi〉 (i ∈ S −D), and set
c0i = 0 if i ∈ U which means αi is unmeasured by Alice, or c0i = 1 if i ∈M −D which means
αi is already measured by Alice. Thus after solving Problem P, a string c
0 = (c0
1
c0
2
...c0n)
(n ≡ |S −D|) is created. Then we can adopt the codeword method in BCJL QBC protocol
[17], encoding a codeword with c0 to make it oriented to the commit bit b. So the entire
description of our QBC protocol is:
The commit protocol: (commit(b))
(C1) Alice and Bob first agree on a security parameter s, then
s
DO
i=1
Alice picks θi ∈
(0, pi/2) (θi needs not to be different for different i. For example, one can fix θi = pi/4
throughout the whole protocol) and randomly picks qi ∈ {0, 1}, and prepares an entangled
state |ψi〉 = |αi ⊗ βi〉 = cos θi |x〉α ⊗ |0, qi〉β + sin θi |y〉α ⊗ |1, qi〉β. Then she sends βi to Bob
and stores αi;
(C2) Bob chooses a number s′ (0 6 s′ 6 s) and randomly divides S ≡ {1, ..., s} into
two subsets S ′ and S ′′ such that |S ′| = s′, S ′′ = S − S ′. Then for ∀i ∈ S ′ Bob stores βi
unmeasured. And for ∀i ∈ S ′′ Bob randomly picks a basis p′i and measures βi. The outcome
is denoted as |p′i, q′i〉β;
(C3) Bob chooses fa, fb, fc (0 < fa, fb, fc < 1/4 and fb > fc) and announces to Alice
the “fake” results {|p′′i , q′′i 〉β |i ∈ S} such that fa = (|La| + s′/4)/s, fb = (|Lb| + s′/4)/s and
fc = (|Lc| + s′/4)/s, where La = {i ∈ S ′′| |p′′i , q′′i 〉β = |p′i, qq′i〉β}, Lb = {i ∈ S ′′| |p′′i , q′′i 〉β =
|qp′i, q′i〉β}, and Lc = {i ∈ S ′′| |p′′i , q′′i 〉β = |qp′i, qq′i〉β};
(C4) Alice divides S into two subsets: M = {i ∈ S|q′′i =qqi} and U = {i ∈ S|q′′i = qi}.
For ∀i ∈ M , She measures αi in the basis (|x〉α , |y〉α). She sets pi = 0 if she finds |x〉α or
pi = 1 if she finds |y〉α. Then she sets D = {i ∈M |pi = p′′i } announces it to Bob;
(C5) Bob sets Ds′ = D ∩ S ′. Then he measures βi (∀i ∈ Ds′) in the basis p′i = p′′i
and denotes the outcome as |p′i, q′i〉β. He agrees to continue only if {i ∈ Ds′| |p′i, q′i〉β =
|p′′i , q′′i 〉β} = φ, D ⊂ La ∪ Lb ∪ Lc ∪ S ′ and |D| ∼ (fa/2 + fb/4 + fc/4)s;
(C6) Alice sets c0i = 0 if i ∈ U or c0i = 1 if i ∈M −D. Thus she obtains a binary string
c0 = (c0
1
c0
2
...c0n) (n ≡ |S −D|);
(C7) Alice and Bob execute the BCJL protocol [17] by using c0 to encode the codeword
(c0 itself is not announced to Bob). That is:
(C7.1) Bob chooses a Boolean matrix G as the generating matrix of a binary linear
(n, k, d)-code C and announces it to Alice, where the ratios d/n and k/n are agreed on by
both Alice and Bob;
(C7.2) Alice chooses a non-zero random n-bit string r = (r1r2...rn) ∈ {0, 1}n and
announces it to Bob;
(C7.3) Now Alice has in mind the value of the bit b that she wants to commit. Then
she chooses a random n-bit codeword c = (c1c2...cn) from C such that c ⊙ r = b (Here
c⊙ r ≡
n⊕
i=1
ci ∧ ri);
(C7.4) Alice announces to Bob c′ = c⊕ c0.
The unveil protocol: (unveil(b, c, c0, |ψi〉))
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(U1) Alice announces b, c, c0, {qi, θi| i ∈ S} and {pi|i ∈M} to Bob;
(U2) Alice sends the quantum registers {αi|i ∈ U} to Bob;
(U3) Bob finishes the measurement on {αi|i ∈ U} and {βi|i ∈ S ′} to check Alice’s
announcement;
(U4) Bob checks |M | ∼ [1/4 + (fa + fc)/2]s and (M −D) ∩ Lb = φ;
(U5) Bob checks b = c⊙ r and (c is a codeword).
Unlike those described in Problem P, in step (C2) we allow Bob to choose a subset
S ′, and delay the measurement on βi (∀i ∈ S ′). For the states in this set, since Bob has
to announce |p′′i , q′′i 〉β randomly before he obtains |p′i, q′i〉β, it is equivalent to lie with the
frequencies fa = fb = fc = 1/4 among the set. Thus by choosing s
′ properly, Bob can
still control the total lying frequencies fa, fb and fc, as those described in step (C3). The
purpose of S ′ is to enhance Bob’s chance on catching Alice cheating in steps (C5) and (U3).
However, the protocol is still valid even if Bob chooses S ′ = φ.
The purpose of step (U3) is to make sure that Alice does not shift the bits in string c0
from 1 to 0. In another word, it is to check whether Alice has already measured a state αi
to make βi collapse, but still tries to say that the two states are left entangled. There are
many type of measurement that Bob can perform to catch this kind of cheating. When both
the two registers αi and βi in |ψi〉 are not measured before (i.e. i ∈ U ∩S ′), Bob can simply
sort them by θi and qi and then measure the amount of entanglement [26] between them.
Since local transformations will not affect the entanglement, Alice can not make a measured
αi entangle with βi without the help from Bob. So if the result of Bob’s measurement turns
out to be zero or much different from the expected value calculated from the form of |ψi〉
Alice announced, Bob should reject this commitment.
For the other states where one of the registers of |ψi〉 is already measured in the commit
phase, Bob can use the form of |ψi〉 Alice announced to calculate the expected state |ei〉 to
which the other register of |ψi〉 should collapse. Then he measures this register in the basis
(|ei〉 , |ei〉⊥). As we know, different measured results of one of the registers will cause the other
register to collapse to different states, and these states are not orthogonal to each other when
θi 6= 0∧ θi 6= pi/2. Therefore if Alice has not followed the protocol honestly, the unmeasured
register will have a non-zero probability to be found as |ei〉⊥ by Bob. For instance, suppose
Alice has formerly prepared a state as |ψi0〉 = |αi0 ⊗ βi0〉 = 1/
√
2(|x〉α⊗|0, 0〉β+|y〉α⊗|1, 0〉β).
And in step (C3) Bob announces
∣
∣p′′i0 , q
′′
i0
〉
β
= |1, 1〉β. Alice will then include the index i0
of this state in set M and measures αi0 in the basis (|x〉α , |y〉α). Suppose that she obtain
|x〉α in her measurement. So she will not include i0 in set D. Now since i0 ∈ M − D, she
should set c0i0 = 1. However, the dishonest Alice wants Bob to believe c
0
i0 = 0, so she must
send Bob a fake state α˜i0 . But she does not know the result of Bob’s measurement on βi0 .
Since she has found αi0 as |x〉α in her measurement, there are three possibilities: Bob has
found βi0 as |0, 0〉β, |1, 0〉β, or |1, 1〉β. Then αi0 has collapsed to
√
2/3 |x〉α +
√
1/3 |y〉α,√
1/3 |x〉α +
√
2/3 |y〉α, or |x〉α respectively. If she prepares |α˜i0〉 = |x〉α and sends to
Bob, chances are that Bob has formerly obtained
∣
∣p′i0 , q
′
i0
〉
β
= |0, 0〉β in step (C2) so he
is expecting |αi0〉 =
√
2/3 |x〉α +
√
1/3 |y〉α. Then when he measures α˜i0 in the basis
(
√
2/3 |x〉α +
√
1/3 |y〉α ,−
√
1/3 |x〉α +
√
2/3 |y〉α), he stands 1/3 chances to finds α˜i0 as
−√1/3 |x〉α +
√
2/3 |y〉α and catches Alice cheating. In this case, the probability for Alice
to cheat successfully for this single bit is f = 2/3. As the minimum distance between
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codewords is d, to keep the total number of 0 in c0 unchanged, a dishonest Alice will have to
shift at least d/2 bits of c0 from 1 to 0 to fulfill her cheating. Therefore the total probability
for Alice to successfully cheat this way without being caught is less than max(f)d/2. Since
d/n is fixed to be a constant in the protocol and n ∝ s, this probability drops exponentially
to zero as the security parameter s increases.
The purpose of step (U4) is to make sure that Alice does not shift the bits in string
c0 from 0 to 1. In our protocol, although Alice can shift a bit c0i from 0 into 1 simply by
measuring αi, the total number of 1 in c
0 is already restrained to be about |M −D| ∼
(1 − fb + fc)s/4. Since |M | is already the minimum of the number of states that Alice has
to measure to solve Problem P, if she shift more bits from 0 into 1, there will be too much
1 in c0. So this kind of cheating is easy for Bob to find out. Also, solving Problem P with
|ψi〉 = |αi ⊗ βi〉 = cos θi |x〉α⊗ |0, qi〉β + sin θi |y〉α⊗ |1, qi〉β has a characteristic property: all
lie b among the set of states that Alice measured will be detected. This is because when
βi is found as |0, qqi〉β (or |1, qqi〉β) in Bob’s measurement, αi will collapse to |y〉α (or |x〉α
respectively). If Bob applies lie b by announcing it as |1, qqi〉β (or |0, qqi〉β), Alice is then
expecting to find αi as |x〉α (or |y〉α) in her measurement. Since |x〉α and |y〉α are orthogonal
to each other, so when Alice measures only the states that satisfy q′′i =qqi, lie b will be 100%
detected and none of them will be left in set M −D. Thus if Bob finds (M −D) ∩ Lb 6= φ
in step (U4), he knows that Alice must have measured some states which do not satisfy
q′′i =qqi, or even has not prepared |ψi〉 in the correct form.
Therefore if Alice alters much of the bits in c0, she will inevitably be caught. Nevertheless,
due to the fluctuation of random distribution, we can not expect the size of D detected by
Alice to be exactly equal to (fa/2 + fb/4 + fc/4)s. So if Alice alters only few bits of c
0,
she may escape from being caught. But the codeword method in the BCJL protocol can
avoid this situation. That is, since the minimum distance between any legal codewords is
d, altering only a small number of bits of c0 will not be enough to change a codeword into
another legal codeword. Therefore this way of cheating will make no sense to Alice at all.
Now we will show that the protocol is also secure against Bob. During the commit phase,
since qi is kept secret by Alice, Bob can not know how to divide S into subsets M and U .
Though he knows that in the n-bit string c0 (n = |S −D| ∼ (1−fa/2−fb/4−fc/4)s), there
are d0 ≡ |M −D| ∼ (1−fb+fc)s/4 bits in c0 take the value 1, and the other (n−d0) bits are
0, he does not know the position of these bits. Thus the possible number of c0 is
(
n
d0
)
. Then
Theorem 3.4 in Ref. [17] applies. Briefly, as d0 > γn (γ ≡ H−1(1/2) ∼ 0.1100279), we have(
n
d0
)
>
(
n
γn
)
> 2n/2/
√
n. Divide by 2n−k (the number of syndromes of the code C), and we
get: the number of codewords at Hamming distance d0 has a lower bound 2k−n/2/
√
n, which
is exponentially large in n as long as we choose k/n > 1/2 in step (C7.1). Therefore Lemmas
3.5 and 3.6 of Ref. [17] are also valid for our protocol. That is, Bob has exponentially small
amount of Shannon information on the value of b before the unveil phase.
So we can see that our protocol is both unconditionally binding and concealing, therefore
it is unconditionally secure. Briefly, the protocol evades the MLC-theorem for the following
reason. There are two tasks for Alice to accomplish during the commit phase: Task 1: solve
Problem P; and Task 2: commit the bit b. The purpose of Task 1 is to prepare the input
states for Task 2. The form of Task 2 is quite similar to the BCJL QBC protocol. However,
there is a critical difference: the encoding method. Unlike any protocols that can concluded
by the Yao’s general QBC model, in our protocol, whether a state |ψi〉 = |αi ⊗ βi〉 is encoded
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as 0 or 1 is not depended on the form of αi, but on whether |ψi〉 is an entangled state or not.
If |ψi〉 can be written as |αi〉⊗|βi〉 (which means that it is a non-entangled product state) we
take c0i = 1, else we take c
0
i = 0. Since it is a basic principle that the entanglement between
two systems αi and βi can not be created locally, there does not exist any local unitary
transformation for Alice to map a state |ψi〉 = |αi〉⊗ |βi〉 into an entangled state. Of course
if Alice can maintain every input state of Task 2 in an entangled form |ψi〉 = |αi ⊗ βi〉, she
can unveil c0i with any value she like, since such a state is free to map into |ψi〉 = |αi〉⊗ |βi〉.
But to accomplish Task 1, Alice inevitably has to measure at least a certain number of
these states to break down the entanglement between βi and any other systems and make
|ψi〉 collapse to |αi〉 ⊗ |βi〉 (Here αi can represent any systems not on Bob’s side, including
the environment). And this number sets the maximum of the allowed number of 1 in the
codeword string c0 in our protocol. Therefore, no LOCAL unitary transformation will be
available for Alice to map the state |b〉 = |ψ1〉⊗|ψ2〉⊗ ...⊗|ψn〉 into |qb〉. By this means, the
cheating strategy in the MLC theorem can not work any more, and unconditionally secure
is achieved. Full mathematical proof and detailed discussion on the limitation of the MLC
theorem will be supplied elsewhere.
Thus by using entangled states to run quantum algorithms, we propose an uncondi-
tionally secure quantum bit commitment protocol. Therefore all the other cryptographies
that base on bit commitment, such as unconditionally secure quantum oblivious transfer,
two-party secure computations, quantum coin tossing and quantum oblivious mutual iden-
tification are then straight forward. The potential of quantum cryptography meets a great
development.
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